BYU Law Review
Volume 2009 | Issue 4

Article 7

11-1-2009

Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church:
How Far Is Too Far?
Chase Manderino

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Chase Manderino, Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church: How Far Is Too Far?, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1049 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2009/iss4/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

11/3/2009 10:07 AM

Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church:
How Far Is Too Far?
I do not know whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their
religion,—for who can search the human heart?—but I am certain
that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican
institutions. This opinion is not peculiar to a class of citizens, or to a
party, but it belongs to the whole nation, and to every rank of society.

Alexis de Tocqueville1
I. INTRODUCTION
The same song plays on the jukebox. It’s the one that comes on
every four years or so, beginning with thundering from small-town
pulpits, reverberating in media channels, even finding its way to the
annals of various law reviews. But the tune dies on the lips of
Internal Revenue Service agents; barely an echo can be heard in the
federal courts. The tune of the § 501(c)(3) lobbying restriction may
become a bit catchier if it were clear exactly what it meant.
That clarity can be provided by understanding and then perhaps
modifying the lobbying restriction on religious organizations that
currently exists under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended (the “Code”). Such a modification to the
lobbying restriction is both feasible and practical. Feasible, because
courts have recognized the ability of government to restrict the
lobbying activities of churches.2 Practical, because (1) a modification
would provide a safe harbor to churches that are “chilled” from
entering the political arena under the current framework,3 and (2) it
would allow for better enforcement. Religion, as de Tocqueville and
others have recognized, plays an essential role in defining American

1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 391 (Francis Bowen ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge: Sever and Francis 1862).
2. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th
Cir. 1972) (“Tax exemptions are matters of legislative grace . . . .”); Branch Ministries v.
Rosotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 1999).
3. Stanley S. Weithorn & Douglas F. Allen, Taxation and the Advocacy Role of the
Churches in the Public Affairs, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND
REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 51, 57 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds.,
1993).
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Democracy. But how expansive should that role be and what
restrictions, if any, should be imposed?
These questions are particularly acute in the context of politics
because religious issues often arise in political situations. For
example, the elections of 2008 included referendums on gay
marriage,4 the adoption of children by gay couples,5 stem cell
research,6 and limits on abortion.7 On one hand, what is at stake for
churches is the preservation of the moral fabric of society. On the
other hand, at least from a tax perspective, they risk the potential loss
of tax-exemption status under § 501.8
This Comment focuses on how to best address the tension
between a church’s right to free speech and the potential for
excessive entanglement between church and state through the
lobbying restriction. An analysis of the origin of the lobbying
restriction demonstrates that Congress has placed a meaningful
restriction on church activities. Although a restriction on church
lobbying helps prevent excessive entanglement between church and
state, the restriction’s ambiguity makes adequate enforcement by the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or the “Service”) difficult and at
the same time discourages lobbying that would be beneficial for the
church and society. A two-tiered approach—the first tier drawing
clear lines to encourage some lobbying and strengthen enforcement
and the second tier incorporating elements of the current approach
to help prevent avoidance—is a possible solution.
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the
lobbying restriction on religious organizations and how lobbying,

4. S. Con. Res., 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); Calif. Proposition 8, available
at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/pdf/prop8-title-summary.pdf;
Fla. Marriage Protection Amendment, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/
initdetail.asp?account=41550&seqnum=1.
5. An Act Providing that an Individual Who is Cohabiting Outside of a Valid Marriage
May Not Adopt or be a Foster Parent of a Child Less than Eighteen Years Old, available at
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/elections/elections_pdfs/proposed_amendments/2007293_Adopt_or_Foster_parent.pdf.
6. Mich. Proposals 08-1, 08-2, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/
sos/ED-20_11-08_Props_Poster2_251561_7.pdf.
7. South Dakota Initiative 11: Abortion Limits; Colorado Amendment 48: Human
Life from Moment of Conception; California Proposition 4: Abortion Limits.
8. Apart from the potential of retroactively paying taxes on the part of the church,
donors to the church will lose the ability to take an itemized deduction for contributions made
to the church. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006). Churches, however, are not subject to the 5%
excise tax on lobbying activities imposed by Section 4912. See I.R.C. § 4912(c)(2)(B) (2006).
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even in furthering a tax-exempt purpose, can violate the law. Part III
evaluates whether any type of restriction on lobbying by churches is
necessary, or alternatively, whether there should be an absolute
restriction on lobbying. Part IV discusses whether the current
framework applies the correct approach to churches. Part V evaluates
possible alternatives to the current approach. Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
Many churches see the need to advocate moral reforms through
government policies.9 But just because churches are not lobbying for
economic gain, and rather are attempting to improve society, does
not necessarily shield churches from the § 501(c)(3) restraint on
lobbying. By definition, a charity that qualifies for tax exemption—
regardless if it is a religious organization—is not in business to derive
a profit.10 Being concerned with making profits over the
improvement of society would violate the exclusivity requirements
for any charity under § 501(c)(3) whether or not it is a church.11
Therefore, the argument that the purpose of a church’s lobbying
should somehow shield it from scrutiny does not automatically
differentiate a church from § 501(c)(3) entities organized for
educational purposes, scientific purposes, etc., because all of these
organizations are also not primarily interested in deriving an
economic gain.
A. Slee v. Commissioner
A church might argue, however, that even though the noneconomic nature of its lobbying may not distinguish it from other
9. See generally Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for
Religious Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 2357 and H.R. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002).
10. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 2008).
11. A charitable organization must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). “[T]he critical inquiry [into the purpose
of an organization’s operations] is whether [the organization’s] primary purpose for engaging
in its sole activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one
of operating a commercial business producing net profits for [the organization].” B.S.W.
Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978).
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charitable organizations, lobbying by a church is still permissible
under § 501(c)(3) as long as it is in line with its charitable purpose.
While churches disagree on whether lobbying should be permissible
in any form,12 litigation shortly before the enactment of the lobbying
restriction demonstrates that lobbying, to some degree, should be
permissible. In Slee v. Commissioner,13 a taxpayer named Noah Slee14
wanted to take a deduction for contributions he made to the
American Birth Control League (the “League”).15 The League,
however, had a declared objective to influence legislation, seeking
“[t]o enlist the support and co-operation of legal advisors, statesmen
and legislators in effecting the lawful repeal and amendment of state
and federal statutes which deal with the prevention of conception.”16
The League worked continually to further this political objective.17
When the Board of Tax Appeals (the “Board”) decided this case
in 1929, it sided with the Commissioner, holding that the
contributions were not deductible because the League did not
operate exclusively for a charitable purpose.18 The Board first noted
that when organized, the League passed a resolution for “enlist[ing]
the support and cooperation of Legal Advisors, Statesmen and
Legislators.”19 Operationally, the court found that the League did
not act as a charitable organization when it “distribut[ed] . . .
literature seeking the repeal or amendment of statutes which the
League felt hampered it in accomplishing its aims.”20 The court
found that because this lobbying activity attempted to change the
law, the activity fell outside the scope of engaging in a tax-exempt

12. See generally Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for
Religious Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 2357 and H.R. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002).
13. 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929), aff’d, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
14. Mr. Slee was married at the time to the founder of the American Birth Control
League, Margaret Higgins Sanger. See Andrea Tone, A Medical Fit for Contraceptives, in
WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 166, 168 (Mary Wyer et al. eds, 2d ed. 2008).
15. Slee, 15 B.T.A. at 710. The gifts were made in excess of $50,000 over a six-year
period during the 1920s. Id. at 711.
16. Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
17. Id. at 185.
18. See Slee, 15 B.T.A. at 714. Indeed, apart from the exclusivity requirement, the Board
also found that the American Birth Control League failed the organizational and operational
requirement. Id.
19. Id. at 711.
20. Id. at 714.
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purpose.21
This practically per se restriction on propaganda imposed by the
Board was not without merit. The Treasury regulations in force at
the time provided that a charity distributing partisan or controversial
propaganda did so outside of its tax-exempt operations.22 While
propaganda has been defined as “the spreading of particular beliefs
or opinions,”23 some associate it with an ulterior motive, or see it as
an attempt to radically change the status quo.24 Thus, while there is a
right to come to the foot of government with “‘entreaty,
supplication, and prayer,’”25 if that supplication is viewed as
propaganda, it will likely be viewed negatively.
Addressing this interpretation of lobbying, the Second Circuit
affirmed the Slee decision on appeal but qualified the Board’s
decision. Judge Learned Hand stated that there are situations in
which modifications of the law are ancillary to the furthering of a
tax-exempt purpose.26 If the law holds an organization back from
fulfilling its exempt purpose, the court suggested that lobbying
efforts, within reason, could be used to change the law.27 As Judge
Learned Hand noted in the case, there are acts by a charity,
influencing law, that do not make that organization any less
charitable; indeed, the legislation the organization influenced may
enable it to become more charitable.28
B. Senator Pat Harrison’s Proposal
In the wake of Slee, Congress debated whether to modify the
Code regarding charitable organizations. In March of 1934, the
21. Id. at 715. The court found that the League engaged in propaganda, and that
“[t]he dissemination of propaganda is usually thought of, not as a charitable, religious, or
educational program, but primarily to accomplish the purpose of the person instigating it,
which purpose here was a change or repeal of statutes.” Id. Note that starting in 1919
regulations issued by the Treasury Department specified that partisan propaganda did not fall
within the activities sanctioned by the tax-exempt statute. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d
1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
22. Slee, 15 B.T.A. at 715.
23. Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955).
24. See id.
25. Id. (quoting John Quincy Adams)
26. Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[T]here are many charitable,
literary and scientific ventures that as an incident to their success require changes in the law. . .
. [A charity] does not lose its character when it seeks to strengthen its arm.”).
27. See id.
28. Id.
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Senate Finance Committee met to discuss H.R. 7835. During the
morning of March 21, Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison moved that
there should be “no deductions from gross income . . . in the case of
contributions made to organizations carrying on propaganda,
attempting to influence legislation or participating in partisan
politics.”29 The Committee approved Senator Harrison’s provision
without a vote.30
As originally enacted, the provision provided that the income tax
should not apply “to any corporation or association organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of
any private stockholder or individual . . . .”31 The Committee
incorporated Senator Harrison’s provision after the word
“individual” so that the language presented before the Senate on
April 2, 1934 added the words “and no substantial part of the
activities of which is participation in partisan politics or is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.”32
Although Slee purportedly precipitated the legislation,33 the
Congressional Record does not reflect an intent to distinguish
between acceptable and harmful lobbying. Senator Harrison stated,
“[T]he attention of the Senate committee was called to the fact that
there [were] certain organizations which [were] receiving
contributions in order to influence legislation and carry on
propaganda.”34 An exclusive focus on Mr. Harrison’s remarks may
suggest that since the provision did not result from a concern about
church lobbying activities, the provision was not intended to prohibit

29. The Internal Revenue Act of 1934: Hearing on H.R. 7835 Before the S. Finance
Comm., 73d Cong. 112 (1934).
30. Id.
31. An Act to Reduce Tariff Duties and to Provide Revenue for the Government, and
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 172 (1913).
32. 73 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934).
33. See, e.g., Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
34. 73 CONG. REC. 5,959 (1934) (“I may say to the Senate that the attention of the
Senate committee was called to the fact that there are certain organizations which are receiving
contributions in order to influence legislation and carry on propaganda.”). Wisconsin Senator
Robert La Follette tried to go further, suggesting that while he understood that Congress
wanted, in some cases, to encourage contributions, the allowance of a tax deduction does “not
make a penny’s worth of difference” in what a person contributes. Id. In his judgment, the
government could “never . . . get away from mistakes of administration and from decisions
which may seem like favoritism until all contributions to organizations of this kind are made
subject to the income tax.” Id.
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lobbying by churches.
The Congressional Record also shows, however, that the Senate
expressed no concern for churches when evaluating the adverse
effects that result from the provision. The Senate Finance Committee
had concerns that the scope of the remedy would be greater than the
problem and, consequently, worried that the provision would
adversely affect activities by organizations that did not warrant
concern.35 But the concern manifested on the Senate floor did not
center on or even mention churches. Rather, the concern focused on
organizations that had a direct reliance on legislation to advance
their charitable cause, such as the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals.36
Churches thus cannot necessarily rely on the purpose of the
provision as a possible shield from the application of the lobbying
restriction. Further, a plain reading of the statute does not
differentiate between churches and other charitable organizations. A
church, using Slee, may try to argue that the provision only applies to
lobbying that is not in furtherance of its tax-exempt purpose.37 This
argument must fail, however, or else the lobbying restriction would
be no different than the exclusivity requirement found under §
501(c)(3).
Under the exclusivity requirement, a church must “operate[]
exclusively for religious . . . purposes.”38 The regulations clarify that
exclusively does not mean that a charity cannot engage in a non taxexempt activity. Rather, a charity will be regarded as operating
exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose as long as any of its activities
that are not in furtherance of an exempt purpose are insubstantial.39
The lobbying restriction of § 501(c)(3) has a similar substantiality
requirement. The lobbying restriction provides that “no substantial
part of the [church’s] activities . . . [involves] carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . .”40

35. Pennsylvania Senator David Reed acknowledged that the “amendment goes much
further than the committee intended it to go.” 73 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934).
36. Id.
37. Or, in other words, lobbying that is in furtherance of a private interest rather than a
public interest. See Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955).
38. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).

1055

DO NOT DELETE

11/3/2009 10:07 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

Since both restrictions have a substantiality requirement, if the
lobbying restriction only applied to activities not in line with a taxexempt purpose, the only way a charity could violate the lobbying
restriction would be to become substantially involved in legislation
that would be for a benefit other than a charitable purpose. If the
lobbying restriction only applied to activities not in line with a taxexempt purpose, however, it would be redundant of the exclusivity
requirement.41
Interpreting the lobbying restriction to apply to activities
furthering a tax-exempt purpose, which avoids redundancy of the
exclusivity requirement, is supported by the legislative history of the
provision and by the judiciary.42 The enactors of the provision
realized the scope of the provision would militate against action
taken to further a tax-exempt purpose.43 Although selfish motivation
could violate the restriction, an organization does not apparently
need to have a selfish motive for a violation to occur.44
III. TO LOBBY OR NOT TO LOBBY
The legislative history demonstrates that a concern of the reach
of the substantiality requirement did not include the effect on
churches. Although the provision currently can reach churches, the
question remains whether the provision should restrict churches, and
if so, by how much. A look at the extremes—the use of no restriction
41. Thus a church arguing the point in court would most certainly lose, since courts
construe the language of a statute to avoid redundancy. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534
U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
42. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th
Cir. 1972) (“A religious organization that engages in substantial activity aimed at influencing
legislation is disqualified from tax exemption, whatever the motivation.”).
43. While the committee wanted to address the issue of selfish contributions—those
contributions that would advance the personal interests of the giver—it realized that the scope
of the proposal went further. 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934). While there was discussion about
rewording the provision, see Senator Reed’s comment at 78 CONG. REC. 5,959 (1934), no
meaningful revision was made.
44. In response to Senator Couzens’ statement that the activities of the children’s
welfare societies could not be prohibited from lobbying, Senator Reed responded that he was
“not so sure. Take the case of those who are urging the adoption of the child-labor
amendment: Certainly they are not acting from selfish motives, and yet almost their entire
activity is an effort to influence legislation.” 78 CONG. REC. 5,861; see also Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (citing Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1972)) (“An organization that engages in
substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation is disqualified from a tax exemption,
whatever the motivation.”).
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or the use of an absolute restriction—suggests that a middle path
that improves on the current approach would be best.
A. Evaluating Unfettered Lobbying
One option available to address any ambiguity under the current
standard is to not have a lobbying restriction on churches at all. This
approach would be a return to the treatment of churches by the
Code for almost thirty years at the beginning of the twentieth
century. This approach, however, fails to overcome two valid
concerns: (1) the formation of churches in name only to funnel taxfree money into lobbying efforts and (2) the detrimental effect to
legitimate churches if separation between church and state is
impaired.45 The formation of sham churches for the primary purpose
of influencing legislation is a practical consideration that must be
addressed to avoid revenue shortfall and other abuses, whereas the
separation of church and state is more of a theoretical consideration
that must be addressed to incorporate constitutional requirements.
Despite these concerns, some churches feel that unfettered lobbying
benefits both the church and the nation. On the other hand, the
historical context of church and state in the United States suggests
that unfettered lobbying is inappropriate.
1. The rise of the religious right
There is a difference between speaking out on moral issues and
using legislation as a vehicle to change the moral landscape of the
United States. While political viewpoints and religious values often
overlap, the political arena is not the sole option to propagate a
belief in a higher existence and to address moral decay. In fact, many
churches have chosen to refrain from politics altogether. For
example, during the twentieth century, many churches, which have
always had a strong moral voice, have only recently re-emerged with
a strong political voice.46 Jerry Falwell reflected the common view of
45. Further, it should be noted that a vast majority of religious leaders purportedly
oppose influencing politics, at least when it comes to endorsing political candidates. Review of
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for Religious Organizations: Hearing on
H.R. 2357 and H.R. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 39–41 (2002) (statement of Reverend C. Welton Gaddy, Executive
Director, Interfaith Alliance) (stating that a Gallup/Interfaith Alliance Foundation poll found
that 77% of religious leaders did not approve of the supporting of political candidates).
46. See PATRICK ALLITT, RELIGION IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A HISTORY 154 (2003)
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pre-1970s Baptist preachers when he stated that “[p]reachers are not
called to be politicians but to be soul winners.”47
But this hands-off approach soon gave way to an attitude of
“[g]et them saved, baptized, and registered,”48 as Falwell and others
suddenly saw politics as a means to address the moral ills of a
nation—a concern that in their eyes outweighed the need for
separation of church and state.49 Accordingly, Christian lobbying
groups began to spring up, such as Christian Voice and Moral
Majority.50 The Moral Majority and other groups, in turn, created
political action committees, which funded the campaigns of various
conservative lawmakers.51
2. The Founders and the Court
From the inception of this nation, both the public and the
Founders thought that the state should not get involved with
directing the spiritual affairs of the populace.52 What is not as clear,
however, is the ability of churches to lobby for the government to
interfere “civilly,”53 through social programs such as faith-based
initiatives. A look back at the historical relationship between
(stating that Christians started to flex political muscles in the 1970s after a half century of
being withdrawn); see also Paul Boyer, The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American
Protestantism, in RIGHTWARD BOUND 29, 33 (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds.,
2008) (“Pre-1970s evangelicals, focused on evangelism and denominational concerns,
generally avoided overt political involvement.”). In the 1960s, for example, the traditional
Baptist principle was to focus on preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ and to ignore direct
involvement in issues such as civil rights reform. See ALLITT, supra at 151.
47. Boyer, supra note 46, at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. Id. at 35, 44 (emphasis added).
49. The phrase “separation between Church and State” originated in a letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 1 (2002) (“‘I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of
separation between Church & State.’”).
50. See ALLITT, supra note 46, at 152; KAREN O’CONNER, NO NEUTRAL GROUND?:
ABORTION POLITICS IN AN AGE OF ABSOLUTES 83 (1996).
51. See O’CONNER, supra note 50, at 82–83.
52. JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO
CENTURIES 137 (2008).
53. For a discussion concerning the distinction between spiritual and civil involvement
of government following the Revolutionary War, see id. at 126–33, 153–55 (contrasting the
view of some that civil involvement was a backdoor to establishing religion with the view of
others that by opposing civil involvement, protestors were mistaking “‘their purses for their
consciences’”).

1058

DO NOT DELETE

1049

11/3/2009 10:07 AM

Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church

churches and politics, as well as the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of that relationship, provides the background for understanding that
some limitations should be imposed.
Some of the Founders believed that this civil element of the
separation of church and state would not only benefit the state but
would also be to the overall benefit of the freedom of religious
conscience.54 One controversial aspect of state government
involvement was the use of taxes to support religions. This practice
continued into the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite the
concerns of its impact by many around the country.55 One such tax,
or general assessment, was proposed by Patrick Henry in 1784.56
The assessment did not seek to establish a certain religion. Instead,
the assessment sought to benefit all churches in a jurisdiction and
gave citizens the option of choosing the institution or, in the
alternative, the public education fund.57
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison opposed such taxes;
Jefferson expressing his views in, “An Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom,” and Madison in, “Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments.”58 Madison asserts fifteen arguments against
the allowance, including a protection of liberty argument and an
equality argument. Although the assessment would supposedly apply
to all Christian denominations, Madison still saw danger, asking,
“[w]ho does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with
the same ease any particular sect of Christians.”59 Madison also

54. See Steven Waldman, Why I’m Celebrating Madison’s Birthday, WALL ST. J., Mar.
16, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123714297334033741. Note,
however, that venerable American figures such as George Washington and James Monroe
opposed the idea of separation of church and state. Joy Hakim, A Forgotten Fight for Religious
Freedom, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1985, at 1. Washington, however, eventually opposed such
measures as a general assessment (i.e., tax to support religion). HUTSON, supra note 52, at
136.
55. Massachusetts became the last state to outlaw the practice, abolishing the tax in
1833. HUTSON, supra note 52, at 166.
56. Id. at 117–18.
57. Id.
58. See Waldman, supra note 54.
59. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: COMPRISING HIS
PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND
DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED: VOLUME II 1783–1787, at 186 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., Putnam 1901).
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thought that the proposed law violated freedom of conscience:
“Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and
to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not
yielded to the evidence which has convinced us.”60
While the Madison and Jefferson view was not widely espoused
by the populace at the end of the eighteenth century,61 the Supreme
Court has treated their view as such and consequently has restricted
the ability of government to intervene in the non-spiritual aspect of
religion in the United States.62 The Court, in Everson v. Board of
Education, stated that the “establishment of religion” clause of the
First Amendment not only means that “[n]either a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church[,]”63 but also means that
neither state nor the Federal Government “can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”64
Apart from the consideration of the subject by the Supreme
Court, there are practical examples of the dangers of letting religion
have too much influence in political affairs. As a result of religious
influence on politics, various countries have recognized the validity
of one religion to the detriment or other religions.65
B. Evaluating an Absolute Restriction
A complete prohibition against church lobbying, however, would
also be undesirable. Just as there is a concern of religion having too
much influence in politics, there is, of course, the related concern of
general government oversight of religion;66 the government would
have to monitor church affairs to evaluate whether there is
compliance with the prohibition. While interaction between
60. Id.
61. See HUTSON, supra note 52, at 176–82 (discussing the Court’s interpretation of the
originalist perspective of the separation of church and state and why he views it as incorrect).
62. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–13 (1947). Note that the Supreme
Court previously ruled that the First Amendment protections apply to action by state
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
63. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See DEPT. OF STATE, 110TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT ON INT’L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 2006, at 730 (Joint Comm. Print 2007) (reporting, for example, on religious
freedom in Iran and in Pakistan).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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government and religion is inevitable, the First Amendment religion
clauses are concerned with excessive entanglement.67
In Walz v. Tax Commission,68 the Supreme Court evaluated
whether a provision exempting church property from property tax
found in the New York Constitution violated the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution.69 First, the Court looked
at the purpose of the exemption. It found that instead of attempting
to advance or inhibit religion, New York had made a determination
that certain organizations provide a benefit to the community that
should not be hindered by taxation.70
Second, the Court looked at the effect of the constitutional
provision: if the effect of the provision is to create excessive
entanglement between the government and religion, then the
provision violates the religion clauses.71 In terms of tax relief, “[t]he
exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state and far less than taxation of churches,” serving to
insulate churches from having a fiscal involvement with
government.72
The Court recognized that a tax on church property, on the
other hand, “would tend to expand the involvement of government
by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow
in the train of those legal processes.”73 This involvement, however,
would pale in comparison to the involvement the government would
have if it imposed a blanket restriction on lobbying. Churches often

67. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (“No perfect or absolute
separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of
sorts—one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.”).
68. 397 U.S. 664.
69. Id. at 666–67. The religion clauses of the First Amendment, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, are applicable to the states. See supra text accompanying note 62.
70. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672–73.
71. Id. at 674.
72. Id. at 676. The Court also uses the history of the non-taxation of churches and the
lack of the establishment concerns to support its conclusion. Id. at 676–78. Note that this
argument does not address that exemptions were originally given to established religions.
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption of Religious Organizations from Federal Taxation, in
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 409, 431 n.101 (James A. Serritella ed.,
2006) (quoting John Witte, Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 367 (1991)).
73. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
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“vigorous[ly] advoca[te] . . . legal [and] constitutional positions.”74
As a church advocates a moral position that correlates with a political
topic, the line between moral advocacy and political lobbying is
blurred. An absolute prohibition would not take into account this
reality.75
Further, since even a minor violation under this approach would
be intolerable, the IRS would need broad discretion in its church
audits to prevent abuses. This broad discretion would pose
constitutional concerns because going over church memos,
questioning the intent of sermons, etc., would appear to create the
excessive entanglement the First Amendment seeks to avoid.
1. The UBIT example
The need to avoid excessive entanglement is highlighted by the
Unrelated Business Income Tax (“UBIT”). Congress has seen the
need of auditing churches in the UBIT context and also has realized
that certain protections are necessary. Congress enacted the UBIT in
1950, taxing unrelated business net income of tax-exempt
organizations,76 to address unfair competition between tax-exempt
and taxable entities.77 In 1969, Congress broadened the tax, which
originally did not apply to churches,78 to encompass all charitable
organizations.79
Upon broadening the UBIT, however, Congress realized that
the auditing of churches raised several concerns and added a
subsection to § 7605 that dealt with examining churches.80 When
revisiting the issue in 1984, the Senate Finance Committee

74. Id. at 670.
75. While there is a blanket restriction on electioneering under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
violating this requirement is easier to avoid since a church leader, rather than speaking in
generalities, must either endorse or oppose a candidate.
76. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (1952).
77. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 28 (1950).
78. 26 U.S.C. § 421(b)(1) (1950).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 511 (1969).
80. See 26 U.S.C. § 7605(c) (1970) (“No examination of the books of account of a
church . . . shall be made to determine whether such organization may be engaged in the
carrying on of an unrelated trade or business . . . unless the Secretary [so] believes. . .[,] so
notifies the organization in advance of the examination[, and the] examination . . . shall be
made [only] to the extent necessary to determine the amount of tax imposed by this title.”).
As a result of these concerns, Congress restricts inquiries into and examinations of churches.
I.R.C. § 7611 (2006) (originally enacted in Tax Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1034).
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highlighted some of these concerns. While realizing that the church
form could be utilized to avoid taxes, and thus some oversight is
needed, the committee noted that there is an issue with the
“separation of church and state,” which is further “compounded by
the relative inexperience of churches in dealing with the IRS and the
resulting occasional misunderstandings between churches and the
IRS.”81 The resulting Church Audit and Procedure Act limits the
ability of the Service to audit churches by, for example, limiting the
records that are necessary to complete an audit and limiting the
amount of audits the Government can conduct.82
IV. EVALUATING THE CURRENT APPROACH
Unfortunately, the current approach to lobbying under §
501(c)(3), while on its face giving churches some breathing room
but not an unfettered ability to lobby under a substantiality
requirement, is inadequate because of its ambiguity. This ambiguity
presents both enforcement concerns for the IRS and the potential to
hinder the free speech of churches.
A. Enforcement Problems
Under the current statutory approach, the IRS has trouble
imposing a tax even if that activity is clearly substantial. Churches do
not have to file a Form 1023 with the Service to receive tax-exempt
status,83 nor do churches have to be registered in order for donors to
take a charitable deduction on their tax returns.84 Donors and church
members have little incentive to monitor church activities because
the deductibility of their donations, under § 170, depends on the
continuing application of a tax-exempt status. The IRS is thus left to
rely on tips from third parties.
The IRS also has little incentive to allocate the resources it has to
regulating churches. Currently, there is an estimated tax gap of $300
billion.85 Of that amount, $100 billion is estimated as collectible.86
81. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984:
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 873
(Comm. Print 1984).
82. See Gaffney, supra note 72, at 442.
83. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2006).
84. Internal Revenue Publication 526, at 2 (2008).
85. John McKinnon, White House Leans Toward Tighter Enforcement of Taxes, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A4.
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The IRS would be better served by having security dealers report the
purchase price of sold securities and by having credit card companies
report the revenue of small restaurants.87 The IRS also is allocated
funds that are invested “in high return-on-investment activities that
generate improved compliance and fairness in the application of tax
laws.”88 While revenue can be generated from evaluating church
activities, auditing churches will likely not produce the return on
investment that would result from prosecuting offshore tax shelters
and regulating profitable corporations or wealthy taxpayers.89
B. Uncertainty
While some may argue that the ambiguity of the current
approach provides an effective limit on religious interference with
government,90 on the other hand, the approach may hinder the
exercise of religious conviction. When churches are left guessing
whether something is political or not, and as a result they refrain
from that activity, they may be missing out on a valid opportunity.
The difficulty in deciphering what is political and what is not reflects
that in certain contexts, religious and political matters overlap. Thus
while the wall between religion and state may be firm and high, it
might not run along a straight line.91 While arguably all political and
religious ideas are related, there are some that are so fundamental to
religion, that although the legislation is clearly furthering its
“charitable” mission, a church might not advocate its position in
order to avoid the loss of its charitable status.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY:
RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 91 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf (budget for the fiscal year 2010).
89. The United States is currently pushing to require greater disclosure of U.S. funds
deposited abroad. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp, Glenn Simpson & David Gauthier–Villars,
U.S. Wants More Client Names from UBS, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A1.
90. Irrespective of how religion is kept out of politics, the majority of Americans now
believe that religion should be kept out of politics. Some Social Conservative Disillusionment:
More Americans Question Religion’s Role in Politics, THE PEW FORUM OF RELIGION AND
PUBLIC LIFE (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=334.
91. For example, the government has seen the value of religion in promoting social
programs by implementing a faith-based initiative. Initiated by President George W. Bush,
President Barack Obama announced the continuance of a modified program on February 5,
2009. David J. Wright, Taking Stock: The Bush Faith-Based Initiative and What Lies Ahead,
THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. WELFARE POL’Y (2009).
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Thus the current approach fails to provide much guidance to
churches regarding when lobbying becomes too much lobbying.
Because courts choose to look at the facts and circumstances of each
case, churches are often left not testing the political water, unwilling
to risk presenting a case that could be ripe for § 501(c) revocation.
As an example of an unwillingness to risk negative repercussions,
churches may read letters from the pulpit advising members that the
church refrains from political activity.92
This chilling effect of § 501(c)(3), welcome or not, goes beyond
the original purpose of the provision. As discussed previously, the
intent of the drafters was to inhibit the funneling of money through
charities supporting legislation for the purpose of avoiding
taxation.93 While in the context of churches there is the additional
concern of the separation of church and state, an allowable amount
of lobbying should not be muzzled by uncertainty.
V. ALTERNATIVE TESTS
While the current lobbying test under § 501(c)(3) could be
modified to better address enforcement issues and to provide more
certainty, it is not immediately clear what would be a better
approach. Too much certainty provided by the IRS could spur
avoidance, while an attempt to capture the actual lobbying activity of
a church could create entanglement issues between church and state.
A modified approach would ideally balance and address each of these
concerns.
A. Applying § 501(h) to Churches
Currently, under § 501(h) of the Code, a § 501(c)(3)
organization, but not a church,94 can elect to subject itself to a
quantified test evaluating lobbying by filing a Form 5768.95 The
organization can make up to $1 million in lobbying expenditures
during a taxable year, based on a percentage test of expenditures for

92. Even though the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints became involved in
Proposition 8, it attempted to limit that involvement, such as avoiding the use of buildings,
and communicated this by letter. See Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in
Ban of Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1.
93. See discussion supra Part II.B.
94. I.R.C. § 501(h)(3)(B) (2006).
95. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2006).
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exempt purposes.96 This provision also gives an organization a
reprieve if the organization exceeds its limitation during a single
year; to cause revocation, the organization has to normally exceed
the limitation,97 which the Treasury Regulations defines as exceeding
150% of the limitation over a four-year period.98
Congress precluded churches from the § 501(h) election upon
the request of various churches.99 These churches believed that part
of their mission encompassed legislative lobbying and did not want
any explicit limitation put upon their freedom of speech right. Other
churches that take the view that their mission does not include direct
involvement in politics are also unlikely to accept the application of §
501(h) to churches on the grounds that it would condone some
level of political activity by churches.
Whether or not desired by churches, the test inadequately
addresses avoidance. Much of a church’s activities may not constitute
cash outlays at all. A church would likely be further incentivized to
influence legislation through means other than expenditures in order
to avoid exceeding the statutory cap. And unlike other charitable
organizations, the policing of a church is more difficult to impose
because of the desire to avoid excessive entanglement that is
prohibited by the separation of church and state under the First
Amendment.100
B. Modified § 501(h)
As suggested recently by one commentator, instead of applying §
501(h) directly to churches, Congress could take the basic premise
of that subsection—the setting of a fixed line—and modify it to take
into account not only actual expenditures, but also the intangible
activities of a church.101 This test would take into account such
intangibles as mailing lists and goodwill, and in theory would
partially incorporate the “fairness” provided by § 501(h) while

96. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(2)(B), 4911(c)(2) (2006).
97. I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (2006).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3(b)(1)(i) (2000).
99. Kim Bouchillon, Comment, Guiding Lobbying Charities into a Safe Harbor: Final
Section 501(h) and 4911 Regulations Set Limits for Tax–Exempt Organizations, 61 MISS. L.J.
157, 164 n.56 (1991).
100. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
101. See generally Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of
Charities, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 370 (2009).
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providing a clearer picture of all expenditures.
1. Fairness
Under a modified § 501(h) approach, churches appear to be on a
level playing field; churches with very large expenditures cannot
allocate a disproportionate amount, in dollar per dollar terms, as
compared to a smaller church, which would otherwise allow the
larger churches to wield great political influence.102
But while it is argued that “[i]t is hard to see a good justification
for [the current law that gives], in effect, . . . political influence to
only the largest charities,”103 there appears a very good justification:
the focus of the law is on promoting the activities of organizations
that provide for the basic needs of society.104 Since the purpose of §
501 is to provide an exemption for organizations that perform vital
services to the American community that the government would
otherwise have to provide; it follows that the limitation on lobbing
should be secondary to that main concern. Shifting the focus from
the primary purpose to a subsidiary purpose would allow the political
tail to wag the charitable dog.
Also, the need for a fixed limit on lobbying should not be
inferred from the structure of § 501(h).105 While a charity cannot
expend more than $1 million on lobbying under that subsection,
that amount is the upper end of a sliding scale.106 The more an
organization spends the more that organization can use for lobbying,
up to $1 million.107 For example, an organization that expends
$500,000 can only direct $100,000 of that amount towards
lobbying.108 Thus, § 501(h) could be viewed as recognizing that the
more expenditures an organization makes, e.g., the larger the
organization is, the more that it can spend on lobbying.109
102. See id. at 370, 376.
103. Id. at 370.
104. See H.R. REP. NO. 75–1860, at 19 (1939).
105. Professor Galle argues that the $1 million limitation of § 501(h) implies that
Congress intended to impose a fixed ceiling on lobbying. Galle, supra note 101, at 376.
106. See 26 U.S.C. § 4911(c)(2) (2006).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. A counterargument is that the sliding scale prevents a small organization from using
100% of its expenditures on lobbying. If, however, the concern is on the size of a contribution,
there should not be a concern with the percentage of expenditures going towards lobbying as
long as those expenditures are being used in furtherance of a tax-exempt purpose.
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More importantly, commentators recognize that § 501(h)
provides a safe harbor for charities that supplements, not replaces,
the prior § 501(c)(3) construction.110 Congress could have replaced
the lobbying restriction of § 501(c)(3) but instead opted to provide
an alternative test for charities—the test is optional, not mandatory.
And despite an argument that a safe harbor test provides the most
assurance to massive organizations that spend a large sum on
lobbying,111 it in fact provides greater guidance to comparatively
smaller organizations because an expenditure equal in size to that
made by a larger organization would more likely trigger the
substantial test for the smaller organization. For example, if an
organization spent $1.5 million on lobbying in a year, there is little
doubt that an organization that has total expenditures of $10 million
would be in more need of guidance than a “massive organization”
that spends the same in lobbying but has total expenditures of $100
million to determine if that spending were substantial.
Further, lobbying by churches is most often in line with their
charitable purpose. The activities of large churches would be more
concerning if they were funneling money and other activities into
lobbying efforts with a primary focus on driving a political agenda.
The organization in this case would be both serving as a church and
a political machine, in which case, the concern should not be
addressed through the lobbying requirement, but rather through the
exclusivity requirement of § 501(c)(3).112
Finally, under a bright-line test, large organizations would be
incentivized to break up into several smaller organizations to avoid
any spending limitation. Of course the IRS could react by imposing
associational tests, looking at ownership and commonality in
organizations, but once the line is drawn in the sand, the Service will
always have to be one step ahead of a charity to continually prevent
abuses.
2. Clearer picture
Apart from fairness concerns, an approach that is based on

110. Laura Chisholm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the
Rationale, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 225–26 (1988).
111. Galle, supra note 101, at 376–77.
112. See discussion supra Part II comparing the exclusivity requirement to the lobbying
restriction.
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applying a fixed amount, like a § 501(h) test, could provide more
clarity in evaluating lobbying activity.113 Allocation of actual
expenditures, however, can prove difficult, and unfortunately, if a
modification to § 501(h) is attempting to quantify intangibles such
as volunteer work and goodwill of the organization, any clarity
provided by § 501(h) is lost.
One commentator argues that goodwill needs to be
quantified.114 An example of such goodwill is when a leader of a
church speaks to the members. Normally the associated costs would
be calculated by looking at the value of the church’s resources, such
as time, that were used to conduct the activity. That calculation,
however, overlooks the fact that the message shared possesses value
for the listeners that, if given to an unrelated party, would not have
the same effect. The difference is that the effect of the message
reflects goodwill.115
Another intangible that may need to be measured is the value
associated with any list a church uses to facilitate its lobbying
efforts.116 For example, phone lists can be used to solicit help and
donations. The IRS would normally only take into account the salary
and overhead costs attributed to the time church staff used the list,
but not the cost of preparing the list.117 In theory, part of that cost
should be allocable to the lobbying efforts since the lobbying would
not have occurred but for that unaccounted-for expenditure.
Finally, another expenditure that may be overlooked is the
volunteer work and donations of church members directly to a cause.
For example, leading up to the vote on Proposition 8 in California,
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS
church”) spent time knocking on doors, calling neighbors, posting
signs, and otherwise advertising support for the proposed change to
the California Constitution. The IRS has taken the position that,
under the § 501(c)(3) test, the time involved in such volunteer
efforts should be considered in determining whether substantial
lobbying has occurred, as should the costs to the organization of
preparing the volunteers.118
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Galle, supra note 101, at 372–73.
See id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-2(b)(4)(ii)(C) ex.8 (2008); IRS Pub. 1828, at 6 (2008). But
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While taking the aforementioned expenditures into account
would provide a more accurate picture of the lobbying of a church,
such an approach obscures the clarity that a provision modeled after
§ 501(h) should provide. For example, how will goodwill be
measured? Financial accounting recognizes the difficulty of
measuring goodwill in that it does not permit goodwill to be
recognized as an asset in a company’s books unless the company is
purchased and an excess is paid for the company. And even if the
cost of an activity can be measured—such as the costs of producing
lists—how is that cost to be allocated? If the church were a
corporation that had terminated in the tax year in question,
presumably one could find the total use of the lists and allocate the
costs to produce the lists based on lobbying and non-lobbying use.119
But since the church will also use the list in the future, an exact
allocation of the costs to produce the lists would be impossible.
Allocation of volunteer work would be equally problematic.
First, unless a thorough record is maintained, it will be virtually
impossible to determine the total amount of hours expended on
lobbying efforts. If those hours could be determined, how would
they be quantified? Under the current application of § 501(c)(3), the
amount of time can be a factor in determining lobbying activity, but
if this approach is revised to reflect the fixed approach of § 501(h), a
conversion from time to dollars would be needed. Should that cost
be what a church would have to pay someone to do the work? Or
should it be the foregone salary of the individual performing the
volunteer work? For example, if an attorney bills $250 per hour at
her regular job, and she volunteers ten hours, should there be an
allocation of $2,500 to the church’s lobbying efforts?
The problem with allocating volunteer work is further
compounded by the different capacities in which a church member
can act. When a church member volunteers time or gives money to a
cause, does he or she do so in the capacity of a representative of the
church, or in the capacity of an individual concerned citizen?
Determining which hat an individual wears is crucial in respecting

the actual expenditures made by volunteers are not taken into account. 26 C.F.R. § 56.49112(b)(4)(ii)(C) ex.8 (2008).
119. Of course determining the total use would also be very burdensome. The IRS could
operate under a presumption that the use was 100% for lobbying unless shown otherwise by
the organization. In the case of a church, however, such a burden would be problematic under
the Code and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
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freedom of speech and thus in correctly allocating costs. Some
church members devote all of their time to their church and arguably
all of their actions can be attributed back to the church. But most
church members have full-time jobs outside of their church and do
not devote their lives solely to church service.
Also, the permissibility of evaluating these activities by a church
is uncertain. While churches may be required to give an initial report
of the expenditures made in a lobbying effort,120 the IRS is restricted
under the Church Audit Procedures Act (“CAPA”) as to when, and
to what extent, an audit can be made of churches.
Even if the IRS could probe into the actual value of these costs,
and if it in fact decided to spend the time and money investigating
the matter, the IRS may not be justified in doing so. Members of the
LDS church, for example, were estimated to have spent
approximately $20 million in support of Proposition 8.121 Using this
amount to evaluate whether a church violated a lobbying restriction
would not, however, be in line with the fear that legislators had
when Congress originally passed the lobbying restriction; namely,
the funneling of money through a charity to influence legislation taxfree.122 Those donations were after tax donations, and thus the
government was not subsidizing any lobbying by allowing such
donations to occur.
Finally, if the goal is to prevent a § 170 deduction for lobbying
efforts, a cogent rationale is also lacking for quantifying the value of
volunteer work done in substitution of the giving of charitable
contributions.123 Under no circumstances is the rendering of services
120. For example, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints had to report to the
state of California expenditures made in support of Proposition 8.
121. Galle, supra note 101, at 373 (citing Jesse & Johnson, supra note 92, at A1).
122. See 73 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Reed).
123. Professor Galle cites the theory that lobbying should be limited because charitable
deductions are more valuable to rich contributors to support his argument that there must be a
more meaningful limitation on large charities. Galle, supra note 101, at 377. While this
argument is viable to show that lobbying of charities in general should be limited, not only
because of the higher after-tax benefit to the wealthy, but also because the wealthy are more
able to donate, it does little to distinguish the giving between large and small charities. A small
organization, for example, can get 100% of its donation from a patron that is taxed at the
highest marginal rate, and thus who will get the highest maximum benefit for donating.
Whereas a larger organization may get myriad donations that include donations from
individuals at lower marginal rates. Professor Galle also applies a second theory to support his
argument, one that supports a lobbying restriction to preserve the distinct spheres of
government and charity. Id. This argument is more salient since there are set amounts that
would impact politics, regardless of the size of the organization lobbying.
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deductible for tax purposes under § 170.124 If volunteer work is
contributed instead of cash, such work is not taking the place of an
otherwise deductible payment, because a contribution to a lobbying
effort would only be deductible if made in the form of a tangible
outlay to the church.
C. Percentage Test
Instead of imposing a set dollar threshold, another alternative
proposed in the past is the imposition of a set percentage test. On
September 21, 2001, Representative Phillip Crane introduced H.R.
2931, the “Bright-Line Act of 2001,” in the House of
Representatives.125 Under Representative Crane’s bill, the
“substantial part” lobbying test would be modified, prohibiting
lobbying only if expenditures exceeding twenty percent of gross
revenues.126
While the bill never made it out of committee, the idea of a
percentage test has been previously attributed to a pair of cases:
Seasongood v. Commissioner127 and Haswell v. United States.128 These
cases illustrate two different incidents of lobbying—one found to be
an insubstantial activity, the other found to be substantial.129
In Seasongood, the Sixth Circuit found that the substantiality
requirement had not been violated where a § 501(c)(3) organization
had exerted less than five percent of its time and effort to influence

124. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2000) (“No deduction is allowable under section 170
for a contribution of services.”). If, however, the individual makes a cash outlay to help
perform the services, such as an expenditure for transportation costs, the related unreimbursed
portion can be deducted. Id. This provision most likely addresses the administrative difficulty
of taking into account imputed income. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 229 (3d ed. 2004).
125. 147 CONG. REC. 17,658 (2001); H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001).
126. H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill defined gross revenues as the sum of
gross income and aggregate contributions and gifts. Id.
127. 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
128. 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974). Some commentators believe these cases created a
rough framework to determine whether lobbying activities are substantial.
129. Evaluating the percentage of expenditures on a certain activity has also been
considered under the exclusivity requirement. In one case, the Tax Court found that
expending ten percent of outlays on a non tax-exempt purpose did not violate the exclusivity
requirement of § 501(c)(3). World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 967 (1983). The
Tax Court also noted, however, that substantiality has to be evaluated “under the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Id.
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political activity.130 The organization’s Articles in Seasongood stated
that the group had an educational purpose; namely to inform
citizens of public health issues and to encourage participation in civic
duties.131 The organization, however, also distributed materials
urging action on legislation and encouraging support of certain
candidates.132
On the other end of the percentage spectrum, the United States
Court of Claims found that expenditures used in an attempt to
influence legislation that constituted over sixteen percent of total
expenditures were substantial.133 In Haswell, the taxpayer started an
organization focused on stemming the tide in the decline of
passenger railroad service.134 While the organization attempted to
influence the public through publications and speeches, it also
initiated litigation against the Interstate Commerce Commission,
gave direct testimony in front of congressional members, submitted
writings to congressional committees, conducted informal meetings
with members of Congress, and had an organization—the National
Counsel Associates—meet with the Department of Transportation
and the Interstate Commerce Commission to advocate on its
behalf.135 In finding substantial lobbying, the court noted that
17.04% and 16.6% of its expenditures in 1967 and 1968 respectively
went towards political activity.136
While a percentage test appears to provide greater certainty in
evaluating the lobbying activities of a church, in reality, great
ambiguity still exists. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Christian Echoes
National Ministry v. United States, “[a] percentage test to determine
whether the activities were substantial obscures the complexity of
balancing the organization’s activities in relation to its objectives and
circumstances.”137 The court in Haswell also recognized this
complexity,138 and while it informed its decision with a percentage
130. Seasongood, 227 F.2d at 912.
131. Id. at 909.
132. Id. at 909–10.
133. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1146–48.
134. Id. at 1136.
135. Id. at 1137–39.
136. Id. at 1146.
137. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th
Cir. 1972).
138. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1142. The court in Seasongood avoided any complexity by
taking the taxpayer’s word at face value without actually evaluating what percentage of its
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evaluation, the determination of the correct percentage in light of
the organization’s circumstances appeared highly subjective.
Although, for example, the court determined that the charitable
organization expended 20.5% of its cash outflow on lobbying in
1967, the government allocated 76.1% of the organization’s
expenditures to lobbying.139
Moreover, the court in Haswell looked strictly at cash
expenditures. Lobbying efforts, however, can largely consist of
volunteer efforts and other non-monetary activities.140 As highlighted
above, it is difficult to quantify many of these activities for
comparison purposes. And if a court is to look at the non-monetary
activities of a church used for lobbying, the court should also look at
the church’s total activities.141 In other words, in order to be fair and
accurate, if the numerator takes into account non-monetary activities
(i.e., lobbying activities) so should the denominator (i.e., total
activities). But again, there would be difficulty in determining what
proportion of the activities by a church member is done in an
individual capacity and what proportion is done in the capacity as a
representative of the church.
Besides the complexity of quantifying these activities, an
investigation attempting to discover a church’s cumulative activities
would most likely lead to the type of excessive entanglement
contemplated in Walz.142
D. Involve the FEC
Another possible approach that has been suggested is to involve
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) in monitoring political
activity.143 Unlike the IRS, which depends on third party referrals,
“[t]he FEC already has procedures in place for dealing with

expenditures actually constituted lobbying. See Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 912
(6th Cir. 1955).
139. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1146.
140. See, e.g., IRS Pub. 1828, at 6 (2008).
141. While this is also a problem under a provision that is based on § 501(h), discussed
previously, the percentage approach provides the additional complexity of attempting to
determine the total amount of activity by a church.
142. See supra Part II.B.
143. See Kelly S. Shoop, Note, If You are a Good Christian You Have No Business Voting
for this Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal Elections, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
1927, 1946 (2005).
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campaign finance regulations.”144 The FEC specifically regulates
election activities, whereas the IRS has to deal with all situations
regarding taxation.
This approach may very well help in the campaigning context.
Since § 501(c)(3) imposes a blanket restriction on supporting or
opposing candidates, enhanced enforcement may adequately address
campaigning concerns. The involvement of the FEC, or the
providing of any resources to help the IRS, however, would only
solve half of the equation. The agencies, and churches, would still be
unclear on what “substantial” means.
E. A New Approach
A compromise test would place a threshold dollar amount on
lobbying activities by churches. If that dollar threshold were crossed,
the church, under § 6001, would have the burden to show that it
merits tax-exempt status.
1. Initial threshold
First, the expenditure test by churches would look at actual
expenditures, not intangibles. For example, airline travel and hotel
stay, purchases of supplies, and advertising spots would be measured,
but items such as the use of church lists and volunteer time would
not.145 The threshold would have to be somewhat high so that it
would not be easily violated, but low enough that a further analysis
could be applied if necessary.146 The FEC, or a different organization
besides the IRS, would evaluate whether the threshold had been
crossed.147 The involvement of another agency could possibly resolve
the problem of lack of resources that apparently plagues the IRS’s
ability to regulate the activities of churches.
Under state law, churches in various areas must already report
their expenditures in funding measures aimed at influencing
legislation. This self-reporting mechanism, if tailored to prevent easy
144. Id. at 1948.
145. Volunteer time and other factors can be taken into account once the threshold is
crossed.
146. A possible weakness is that a small religious organization could theoretically use
100% of its resources to influence legislation.
147. Some states require that a church report expenditures it made while attempting to
influence legislation. This information, combined with an objective expenditure test, will
alleviate the FEC of an otherwise insurmountable burden.
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avoidance, also helps alleviate CAPA concerns. Then, if the
government knew that the threshold had been passed, a green light
could be given to conduct an audit (at least to a certain extent) of
the church’s activities.
Aside from serving a useful purpose to government agencies, a
threshold dollar amount would allow churches that might not be
engaging in political activities a safe harbor to exercise free speech
rights. This amount will thaw a church’s inability to act that
previously came from uncertainty on the consequences of its taxexempt status.
While a dollar amount could potentially encourage the formation
of small churches, and benefit existing churches, that does not mean
that these churches could engage in political activity at will. First, an
associational test could be used. Unfortunately, as previously
mentioned, such a test would not catch all problems and would
necessarily be reactionary in nature. A possible solution is a goodfaith test—any activity that demonstrates bad faith, untoward results,
selfish motivation, or controversial effect would disqualify small
churches from tax exemption.148
2. Determination of substantiality once threshold has been crossed
If the government agency working with the IRS were to find that
lobbying activity crossed the threshold amount, the IRS would
perform an audit. At such point, in its discretion, the IRS could
choose not to challenge the tax-exempt status. The burden would be
on the church to show that its political activities were insubstantial
under all of the relevant facts and circumstances. Apart from the shift
in the burden, this prong of the test would mirror the current
approach. It would give relief to larger organizations that would
more easily cross the initial expenditure threshold. But there are
important distinctions between the current approach, and a
threshold approach. For example, the threshold test would account
for intangibles once the monetary threshold has been surpassed.
While intangibles may have been recognized as relevant facts and
circumstances under the old approach, a threshold approach would
mandate a clearer picture of the lobbying.149 And since an attempt to

148. See Note, Income Tax Disadvantages of Political Activities, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 273
(1957).
149. But an exact dollar figure does not have to be derived.
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quantify the activity in monetary terms is unnecessary under this
prong of the test, the earlier valuation concern is not implicated.
Further, the concern of possible entanglement of church and state
would be partially alleviated since the government would have a
standard procedure as to when a church’s activities should be more
closely scrutinized. In other words, such a scrutiny would occur only
after a church had crossed the initial expenditure threshold.
3. Possible weaknesses
Arguably, an attack on the idea of providing certainty is that
churches already appear to have the option of safely lobbying
through § 501(c)(4) organizations and the use of PACs. This
possible challenge to the need for an alternative approach, however,
can be addressed by considering the difficulty a church has in
operating under this paradigm. For example, the PAC cannot be
controlled by the church and the donations to it must be distinct
from those made to the church in order to determine to what
donations § 170 applies.
Another possible weakness is that the threshold test could result
in an equal protection violation. For example, there might be a
violation if this provision is applicable to churches, but not to other
charities. To the extent that this concern would actually exist, it can
be eliminated by applying the same treatment to both churches and
other charities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a political atmosphere rife with issues of moral concern,
churches must decide whether to become politically involved
through lobbying. Churches must first realize that even if their
political lobbying is done to further a tax-exempt purpose, the
government can still scrutinize such activity for tax purposes. At the
same time—in light of a church’s legitimate concern in the moral
issues of a society—the government should nonetheless provide
churches with a level of certainty so that they are not politically
muzzled.
An ideal lobbying test would provide a threshold safe-harbor
figure, while at the same time avoiding the imposition of a significant
burden on the church that would create excessive entanglement.
Therefore, Congress, or the Treasury, should enact a test that takes
into account all of the activities of a church while allowing larger
1077

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/3/2009 10:07 AM

2009

churches to keep their tax-exempt status even if an initial threshold is
crossed.
Chase Manderino
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